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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN. v. ILLIANO: PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 16-205.1(B)(1) OF THE MARYLAND 
TRANSPORT ATION ARTICLE, "STOP OR DETAIN" 
ALLOWS FOR OFFICERS TO DEVELOP A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT A DRIVER IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL AFTER THE INITIAL STOP 
By: Stephen Gilpatric 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to section 
16-205.1 of the Maryland Transportation Article, "stop or detain" 
allows officers to develop a reasonable suspicion that a driver is 
driving under the influence after the initial stop. Motor Vehicle 
Admin. v. liliana, 390 Md. 265, 888 A.2d 329 (2005) (emphasis 
added). Once the officer has a reasonable suspicion, he can request the 
driver submit to a breath test. 
In the early morning hours of October 30, 2003, Officer J. Marll 
("Marll") was operating a speed radar trap on the shoulder of Route 
170 in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. At approximately two 
o'clock in the morning, a car pulled up behind Marll's patrol car and 
sat idling. Marll decided to check on the driver, Carmelina Illiano 
("Illiano"), and backed his patrol car alongside the driver's car. At 
this point the driver lowered her driver's side window and Marll 
detected the smell of alcohol. As Marll was parking his cruiser behind 
her car, he observed Illiano get out and switch seats with the 
passenger. Marll approached the passenger side window and asked 
Illiano why she had stopped her car on the shoulder of the road. 
Illiano stated that she had been drinking and should not be driving. 
Based upon this response, and the fact that Illiano appeared 
intoxicated, Marll requested that Illiano complete some field sobriety 
tests. After Illiano failed the field sobriety tests, Marll placed Illiano 
under arrest for driving under the influence. 
Initially, Illiano agreed to take a chemical breath test. However, 
upon arriving at the barracks, Illiano changed her mind and refused to 
submit to the chemical breath test. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 
16-205.1(b)(3), Marll took the following actions: (1) he confiscated 
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her license, (2) he served her a one year suspension, (3) he issued her a 
temporary license, and (4) he informed her of her right to a hearing 
before an administrative judge. For the second time within five years, 
Illiano had refused to submit to a chemical breath test when requested 
to do so; as such Section 16-205.1(b) mandates that her license be 
suspended for one year. 
On March 9, 2004, Illiano appeared before an Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ had to determine whether Marl I had 
reasonable grounds to believe that Illiano was driving a motor vehicle 
under the influence prior to requesting her to submit to a chemical 
breath test. The written findings of the ALJ, discredited Illiano's 
testimony of the facts and upheld the one-year suspension of her 
license. Illiano filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court 
for Carroll County. 
The circuit court held that Section 16-205.1(b)(2) clearly requires 
"an officer have reasonable grounds for detaining someone for driving 
under the influence." Further, according to Section 16-205.1 (b)(2), 
the results of a field sobriety test are irrelevant in determining whether 
the officer had reasonable grounds to originally detain the motorist. 
Based upon these conclusions, the circuit court held that Marll did not 
have reasonable grounds to detain the petitioner and subsequently 
reversed the decision to suspend Illiano's license for one year. 
Subsequently, the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") appealed, 
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of the present case by 
noting Judge Eldridge's description of the court's role in reviewing an 
administrative agency's decision as being narrow. /lUano, 390 Md. at 
274, 888 A.2d at 335; see Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 
556,571,873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005). Additionally, the Court stated 
that the reviewing court has the limited duty of "determining if there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's findings and 
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is based 
upon an erroneous conclusion of law." IlUano, 390 Md. at 274, 888 
A.2d at 335 (quoting Md. Aviation Admin., 386 Md. at 571, 873 A.2d 
at 1154 (2005); see also, United Parcel v. People's Counsel, 336 Md. 
569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994)). Eldridge stressed that, contrary 
to language present in some opinions issued by the Court of Appeals, a 
court's duty "on review is not to substitute its judgment for the 
expertise of those persons who comprise the administrative agency." 
IlUano, 390 Md. at 275, 888 A.2d at 335 (quoting United Parcel, 336 
Md. at 576-77, 650 A.2d at 230) (emphasis added). Finally, courts 
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should give considerable weight to the statutory interpretations applied 
by administrative agencies. ld at 275, 888 A.2d at 335; see Lussier v. 
Md Racing Camm., 343 Md. 681, 696-97, 684 A.2d 804, 811-12 
(1996). 
The Court next addressed the MVA's argument that Section 16-
205.1 (b )(2) allows for an officer to develop reasonable suspicion that a 
motorist is driving under the influence after making the initial stop. 
liliana, 390 Md. at 276, 888 A.2d at 336 (emphasis added). This 
argument directly contradicted the findings of the circuit court, which 
found that any events subsequent to the initial stop cannot be 
considered when determining if the officer had reasonable grounds to 
detain a motorist. ld at 277, 888 A.2d at 337. Thus, the Court of 
Appeals then had to determine which of these two extremely different 
interpretations of Section 16-205.1 was correct. ld at 277, 888 A.2d 
at 337. 
Section 16-205.1 states that "if a police officer 'stops or detains' an 
individual who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is driving 
under the influence, the officer may request that the person submit to a 
breath test." ld, see liliana, 390 Md. at 278-79,888 A.2d at 337-8. 
In its interpretation of Section 16-205.1, the Court focused on the 
use of the word "or", in the phrase "stop or detain" contained in 
Section 16-205.1. liliana, 390 Md. at 278-9, 888 A.2d at 337-8. The 
Court concluded that "the use of the conjunction 'or' indicates that the 
officer may have reasonable grounds to believe that the driver is under 
the influence either [prior to pulling them over] at the time of the 
[initial] stop or, due to events [that transpire] after the [initial] stop." 
ld Therefore, an officer can pull over a motorist for any number of 
reasons-from generally enforcing the laws of the roadway through the 
issuance of a traffic citation-and subsequently develop reasonable 
suspicion that such driver is under the influence of alcohol. ld, see 
State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 609, 826 A.2d 486, 494 (2003). Once 
the officer develops reasonable suspicion that a motorist is under the 
influence, he can request that the person submit to a chemical breath 
test. liliana, 390 Md. at 278-79,888 A.2d at 337-78. 
Based on this statutory interpretation, the Court held that the ALl's 
interpretation of Section 16-205.1 was not based on an erroneous 
conclusion of law. ld at 281, 888 A.2d at 339. Thus, the Court was 
left to the factual determination of whether there were reasonable 
grounds for Marll to believe that Illiano was driving under the 
influence. ld. at 282, 888 A.2d at 340-41. 
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In reviewing the factual findings of an administrative agency, each 
court must employ the substantial evidence test. Id. at 281-82, 888 
A.2d at 339. This "requires that an agency's factual determination[s] 
be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light 
of the entire record as submitted." Id. (quoting Board of Physician 
Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 172,848 A.2d 642, 651 
(2004)). Here, the Court found that the record indicated the following 
facts: Marll smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Illiano's 
vehicle, Illiano made several inculpatory statements, and Illiano failed 
multiple field sobriety tests. Id. at 282, 888 A.2d at 339-40. The 
Court concluded that the ALJ's finding that Marll had reasonable 
grounds to believe Illiano was driving under the influence was 
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 282-83,888 A.2d at 340. 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision, and directed that court to affirm the ALJ's decision 
upholding the one-year suspension ofIlliano's license. Id. 
The holding of this case makes it clear that police officers are 
required to possess reasonable grounds to believe that a motorist is 
operating a vehicle under the influence prior to requesting that a 
motorist take a chemical breath test. However, those reasonable 
grounds can be ascertained at anytime during an encounter with the 
police even if that encounter is not initially related to suspicion of 
driving under the influence. Practitioner's need to be aware that this 
holding removes the requirement that police officers make a threshold 
determination as to a reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the 
influence of alcohol. That determination can now be made at any point 
during a traffic stop. 
